In this paper, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity of link weight, heterogeneity of the frequency or amount of interactions among individuals, on the evolution of cooperation. Based on an analysis of the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a weighted one-dimensional lattice network with intra-individual heterogeneity, we confirm that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, we identify two key mechanisms by which link-weight heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation: mechanisms for spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derive the corresponding conditions under which the mechanisms can work through evolutionary dynamics.
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation, which plays a key role in natural and social systems, has attracted much interest in diverse academic fields, including biology, sociology, and economics [1, 2] . The prisoner's dilemma (PD) is often used to study the evolution of cooperation in a population consisting of selfish * Corresponding author at Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennoudai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0006, Japan. TeL: +81 29 853 5571.
Email addresses: miwata@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp (Manabu Iwata), eizo@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp (Eizo Akiyama) individuals [3, 4] . In the PD game, two individuals simultaneously decide to cooperate or defect. A payoff matrix of the PD game is given in Table 1 .
Cooperation Defection Cooperation
R, R S, T Defection T , S P , P Table 1 : Payoff matrix for the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. In this game, two individuals decide simultaneously to cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation provides them both with a payoff R, whereas mutual defection results in a payoff P . If one individual cooperates and the other defects, the former obtains a payoff T , and the latter a payoff S. These values are assumed to satisfy the conditions T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T .
If either individual wishes to maximize his/her personal profit in this game, he/she will choose to defect regardless of the opponent's decision, despite mutual cooperation being better than mutual defection for both individuals. According to the evolutionary dynamics of the PD game where an individual is paired with a randomly chosen opponent in a well-mixed population, cooperators become extinct whereas defectors eventually dominate in the population [5] .
However, in a dilemma situation in the real world, we often see that altruistic behaviors exist among unrelated individuals. Nowak [6] proposed five rules as the mechanisms enabling the evolution of altruism: kin selection [7] , direct reciprocity [4, 8] , indirect reciprocity [9, 10] , network reciprocity [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] , and group selection [20] .
In this study, we focus on network reciprocity, which is a mechanism pioneered by Nowak and May [11, 12] that enables the evolution of cooperation when each individual is likely to interact repeatedly with a fixed subset of the population only. In Nowak and May's model, individuals are placed on nodes in a two-dimensional lattice and play the PD game repeatedly with their directly connected neighbors only. The authors show that the spatial constraint of interactions among individuals in the lattice network can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. Although Nowak and May's model assumes that the population has a simple network structure, that is, a two-dimensional lattice, it has recently been shown that many real-world networks are identified as complex networks. Well-known examples of complex networks are the small-world network [21] and the scale-free network [22] , in which the number of links (degree)
that each individual has differs. Recently, it has been confirmed by Santos and Pacheco [13] that heterogeneity of the number of links in complex networks can enhance the evolution of cooperation. There have been following studies that investigate the evolution of cooperation on networks with heterogeneous number of links [14, 15] . This heterogeneity is also known to contribute to the efficiency of collective action [23, 24] . Additionally, it has been shown that the mixing pattern of link degree can affect the emergence of cooperation [16] . See [17, 18] for detailed reviews of evolutionary and coevolutionary games on graphs. Also see [19] for a thorough survey of the evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on various types of structured populations.
The aforementioned studies, however, assume that individuals interact with one another with the same frequency or amount; that is, all the link weights between individuals in the society are identical. On the contrary, individuals in real-world networks, such as scientific collaboration networks, phone call networks, email networks, and airport transportation networks, have heterogeneous intentions in their relationships [25, 26, 27] . There is substantial interest among researchers in knowing how heterogeneity of the strength of relationships (that is, link weight) among individuals influences human behavioral traits (e.g.
sociological studies such as [28, 29, 30] ).
In particular, researchers have recently investigated whether the heterogeneity of link weight between individuals promotes the evolution of cooperation. When inter-individual heterogeneity exists, some individuals play the PD game more frequently than others (link-weight amount is heterogeneous among individuals). That is, there is heterogeneity of the interactions among individuals. It has already been shown [13, 14, 15] that heterogeneity of interactions among individuals due to heterogeneity of the number of links among individuals and not to inter-individual heterogeneity can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. The literature [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] has investigated the effect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation from variety of viewpoints 1 . Especially, Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have clearly shown, as mentioned in the above, that the existence of link-weight heterogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation. However, we cannot reject the possibility that the evolution of cooperation in the models of Du et al. and
Ma et al. might be facilitated by the effect of link-weight amount heterogeneity, whose effect on the evolution of cooperation has already been confirmed by Santos and Pacheco [13] . This is because the link-weight heterogeneity in their models involves not only intra-individual heterogeneity but also inter-individual heterogeneity. Whether heterogeneity of link weight without heterogeneity of link-weight amount, intra-individual heterogeneity alone, can promote the evolution of cooperation or not is the remaining question to be solved. Detailed investigation of this question would enable us to understand the underlying mechanism of the evolution of cooperation caused by the heterogeneity of interactions among individuals.
To answer this question, we introduce the simplest possible model of a weighted network, with intra-individual heterogeneity and without inter-individual heterogeneity. First, we employ a weighted one-dimensional lattice as the simplest network model and investigate the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the enhancement of cooperation. Second, we examine when and how such heterogeneous link weight gives rise to the evolution of cooperation; that is, we investigate the mechanism by which heterogeneity enables cooperation to evolve.
1 For example, Cao et al. [35] focused on the dynamics (change over time) of the magnitude of the link-weight heterogeneity. Chen and Perc [38] examined the effect of the heterogeneity in incentives for rewarding individuals in the public goods game on promoting cooperation.
Szolnoki et al. [41] , Perc and Szolnoki [42] , and Santos et al. [43] examined diversity of individuals. Perc [44] introduced the random variations to the payoff of individuals and invetigated the effect of it on the evolution of cooperation. Brede [47] and Tanimoto [48] analyzed the bias in game partner selection.
Specifically, we identify the conditions under which link-weight heterogeneity enables society to become cooperative, through analytical calculation and computer simulation.
The model
In this study, we develop a model of a spatial evolutionary game with linkweight heterogeneity based both on the PD cellular automaton model proposed by Nowak and May [11, 12] and the weighted network model employed by Du et al. [31, 33] , Ma et al. [32] , Buesser [34] , and so on. We construct a lattice network model in which each individual occupies one node and is connected to his/her neighbors by links with heterogeneous weights. Each individual has two links, one shared by the individual to his/her left and one to his/her right. We assume periodic boundary conditions for the network we employ.
There are two types of heterogeneity of link weight in a network: (i) intraindividual heterogeneity: the heterogeneity of link weight between the links of an individual; that is, an individual can have a large-weight link with one neighbor and a small-weight link with another; and (ii) inter-individual heterogeneity: the heterogeneity of link weight between individuals; that is, an individual can have many large-weight links whereas another can have many small-weight links. In this research, we focus on the former type of heterogeneity to begin our investigation on the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation using the simplest form of heterogeneity.
Because we consider a network with intra-individual heterogeneity only (i.e., Hereafter, we assume a large link weight to be w 1 = 1.0 + w and a small weight to be w 2 = 1.0 − w to express w 1 and w 2 using only one parameter, as Π i = j∈Vi π sisj w ij , where V i is the set of neighbors of individual i. In the first generation, each individual's strategy, which is either to cooperate or to defect, is randomly determined with a 50 percent probability. We define the score of each individual in a generation as the sum of the payoffs received from 2 As Nowak and May [11] noted, simulation results are typically not affected by whether the payoff matrix involves P = S or P > S, thus, we assume P = S in our study. This 
Simulation results and discussion
To examine how heterogeneity of link weight affects the evolution of cooperation, we analyzed how the degree of link-weight heterogeneity, w, affected the resulting frequency of cooperation in the population. The frequency of cooperation in each generation was calculated as the ratio of the number of cooperators to the total population size. We defined the frequency for a simulation run as the average of the frequency of cooperation over 100 generations after the 2,000th generation. We adopted this definition because, although we wished to estimate the frequency at the convergent state, we found that this state sometimes did not converge to a fixed state but went to a periodic state. (We checked that the frequency of cooperation could reach a steady or periodic state within 2,000 generations.) We performed 100 runs of the computer simulation for each parameter setting and calculated the average of the frequency of cooperation for all the runs 3 , which hereafter, we refer to as the frequency of cooperation. Fig. 2(a) ) and that of a large b = 1.8 ( Fig. 2(b) ). and "−D≡D−C≡C−D≡D−." Considering the periodic boundary condition, the first three configurations are equivalent to "−C≡C−D≡D−C≡C−," which is shown at the top of Fig. 3(a) . Similarly, the latter three configurations are equivalent to "−C≡C−D≡D−D≡D−," which is shown at the top of Fig. 3(b) .
We define two cooperators connected by a large-weight link as "C≡C cluster,"
two defectors connected by a large-weight link as "D≡D cluster," and one cooperator and one defector connected strongly as "C≡D cluster" or "D≡C cluster."
When "C≡C cluster," "D≡D cluster," and "C≡C or D≡D cluster" are adjacent the fifth individual is a cooperator (see Fig. 3(a) ), else 0 if the fifth is a defector (see Fig. 3(b) ). Thus, in either case, the score of the focal individual (the third Therefore, if the population is subject to a maintenance pattern strategy configuration composed of three adjoining clusters, namely, "C≡C cluster," "C≡D cluster," and "D≡C cluster," whether the focal individual can refrain from changing his/her strategy from cooperation to defection depends on link-weight heterogeneity; that is, he/she remains a cooperator if the heterogeneity w sat- The parameter space for the temptation payoff, b, and link-weight heterogeneity, w, is divided into four regions, namely, region I, where both conditions are satisfied, region II, where only the spread condition is satisfied, region III where only the maintenance condition is satisfied, and region IV where neither condition is satisfied.
Simulation analysis on a large population
The two conditions identified in the previous subsection are based on the analysis of a small population (six nodes); nevertheless, whether these two con- at Threshold B at which point the cooperation frequency starts to decrease in a stepwise manner in Fig. 2(a) , and (w, b) is located at the boundary between regions I and II in Fig. 5 . Similarly, also in the case where b = 1.8, the phase shifts in Fig. 5 through regions as an increase in the value of w correspond to the changes in the cooperation frequency seen in Fig. 2(b) .
We have found that the two conditions identified in the small group can explain the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the level of cooperation frequency in a large population. However, so far we have confirmed this only in the cases with b = 1.2 and b = 1.8. Next, we examine the possibility of an application of the two obtained conditions for w to an increase or decrease in the cooperation frequency in a stepwise manner for several thresholds of w over the whole parameter range of b ∈ (1.0, 2.0) (in steps of 0.01). 
Conclusion
Much research has been conducted to analyze the factors that promote the evolution of cooperation in natural and social systems. Recently, several researchers [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] have examined the effect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation. Especially, Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have clarified that link-weight heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation. However, they investigated heterogeneity of interactions among individuals, which includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and interindividual heterogeneity, to the best of our knowledge. Inter-individual heterogeneity leads to heterogeneity of the link-weight amount, which causes heterogeneous interactions similar to those caused by the heterogeneity of the number of links, and the effect of the heterogeneity of the number of links on the promotion of cooperation has already been established in the literature [13, 14, 15] .
Therefore, the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation may be given only by inter-individual heterogeneity whose effect is similar to that of the heterogeneity of the number of links. To investigate whether linkweight heterogeneity within each individual alone can promote cooperation, it is necessary to use a model with intra-individual heterogeneity and without interindividual heterogeneity. Additionally, it has not been fully resolved when and how promotion of cooperation based on the heterogeneity of link weight takes place.
To address these issues, we constructed a simple model of one-dimensional lattice with heterogeneous link weight, on which individuals play the evolutionary PD game. We assumed that the sum of the link weights of each individual was equal, to remove the effect of inter-individual heterogeneity on the promotion of cooperation, thereby focusing only on intra-individual heterogeneity.
By performing calculations and analyses, we obtained the following two results. First, we clarified that the moderate magnitude of intra-individual heterogeneity of link weight can facilitate cooperation and that there are some thresholds in the range of the heterogeneity level, at which the change in the cooperation frequency occurs in a stepwise manner. This result suggests that, even when there is no heterogeneity of link-weight amount that causes a similar effect to that of heterogeneity of the number of links as in Santos and
Pacheco [13] , heterogeneous link weight within each individual alone can promote cooperation. Second, we found the key mechanisms whereby link-weight heterogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation, the mechanisms for the spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derived corresponding conditions for the both mechanisms to work through evolutionary dynamics, which have not been clarified before.
Because the simulation model used is very simple, it may appear to be somewhat unrealistic. However, this simplicity enabled us to examine the effect of heterogeneous link weight (intra-individual heterogeneity) and the aforementioned mechanisms. We believe that our discovery of these mechanisms can form the basis of future researches on link-weight heterogeneity. It would be interesting to investigate the effect of heterogeneity of link weight on the evolution of cooperation and its mechanism using a mathematical model with a more realistic assumption. For example, to extend the network structure from a one-dimensional lattice to a two-dimensional one 5 , or so-called complex networks such as small-world and scale-free networks, would be attractive matter to be worked on as a future work. Another interesting avenue for future research would be to identify the mechanisms by which link-weight heterogeneity that includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-individual heterogeneity, such as link-weight heterogeneity in the real world, promotes cooperation. Although we found in this paper the mechanism by which intra-individual heterogeneity alone can facilitate cooperation, there may be a specific mechanism for the evolution of cooperation caused by the interplay between intra-and inter-individual heterogeneities.
Appendix A. Investigation of the robustness of the results
In section 3.1, we described that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity (intra-individual heterogeneity) can promote more cooperation than in the case where link-weight is homogeneous. Moreover, there are some thresholds in w (a parameter that represents the degree of heterogeneity) at which the stepwise changes of cooperation frequency occur. To confirm the robustness of these results, we examined whether the difference of the network size and the existence of the decision error affect the evolution of cooperation.
Appendix A.1. Robustness of the results against the system size
To check the robustness of these results for variations in system size, we employed six one-dimensional lattice networks composed of 100, 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 individuals. By performing the computer simulation provided in section 2, we calculated the cooperation frequency and compared it with that derived from the model with the network size of 10,000 individuals. From these figures, we can see that the results are not different with a variation in system size, as in the following. (i) We observe that homogeneous link-weight heterogeneity (w=0) does not always yield the highest cooperation level in an entire range of w. That is, the moderate magnitude of heterogeneity achieves more cooperation than the case in which the link weight is homogeneous.
(ii) We observe that there are some thresholds in w at which discontinuous changes of the cooperation frequency occur. These tendencies can be seen in the aforementioned six one-dimensional lattice networks. Therefore, we believe that the results obtained are robust with regard to differences in the system size. The first row represents the initial strategy configurations; the second row shows the three classifications of the configurations in which greater link-weight heterogeneity w promotes more cooperation, higher w reduces cooperation frequency, and different values of w do not have any effect on the magnitude of the cooperation level, respectively. In the table, "C"
and "D" denote cooperator and defector, respectively, while "≡" indicates a link with a large weight, and "−" means a link with a small weight. To perform the similar analisys to that in the case of a one-dimensional lattice, we use a with 5×5 sized small lattice and focus on the dynamics of the strategy of one individual. We show an example of the strategy configuration patterns in a two-dimensional lattice with Pattern A in Fig. C.3 . As already mentioned, we observed a stepwise change of the cooperation frequency when w is placed at the threshold 3.0(b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0). In addition,
we confirmed that the threshold 3.0(b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) is one of the conditions for w to achieve the spread of cooperation. Because it is difficult to find all the spread/maintenance pattern strategy configurations that reach different cooperative states depending on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w and to derive all the conditions for the spread/maintenance of cooperation, discovery of these for a two-dimensional lattice is left for future work.
